SIMULATION NOTICE: This document (audit, evaluation, response) is part of an AI-driven role-playing simulation conducted for project quality and governance testing. It does not constitute a formal legal or professional audit by any real-world entity.

1. Audit Perspective: Endorsement of Relative Security Improvement

The Red Team has carefully considered the inquiry from the Product Team regarding the "relative superiority over current vulnerable practices (PPAP, plaintext email, etc.)."

In conclusion, the Red Team approves the early deployment of PoCs limited specifically to "replacing current email-based workflows," provided additional guardrails are enforced. We consider this to be a net security improvement.

Compared to plaintext email, where data is physically exposed during transit, Web/A's L2 encryption—even in a sub-Tier 3 prototype—significantly raises the cost of attack and reduces the total risk volume.

2. Warning: The Risk of the "Security Illusion"

However, when deploying incomplete security features, maximum attention must be paid to the following psychological risks:

  • Overestimation of Confidentiality: The perception of using a "state-of-the-art encryption system" must not encourage users to send extremely sensitive data (e.g., national secrets, critical infrastructure control data) that they would never have sent via email.
  • Accountability: The current reference implementation still contains the "Sovereignty Paradox" and "PRF technical challenges" identified in v6. If these are exploited, it will be difficult for providers to fulfill their legal accountability if the system was marketed as "perfectly secure."

3. Mandatory Guardrails for PoC Deployment

For early adoption, the Product Team must make the following guardrails mandatory operational conditions:

  1. Data Classification Limits:
    • Data handled must be restricted to the level currently handled via "regular email."
    • Explicitly prohibit application to "Top Secret" or high-confidentiality categories until Holder Binding with physical Secure Elements is implemented.
  2. Explicit Warning in UI:
    • The user interface must prominently state that "this system is in a pilot phase and future key rotations or protocol changes may occur."
  3. Mandated TTL on the Post (Relay) Side:
    • Web/A Post operators must prove (via logs) the physical deletion of messages after delivery or after a short window (e.g., 72 hours).
  4. Provisional Replay Defense:
    • Cover protocol-level vulnerabilities by implementing nonce verification or ID caching on the application layer at the receiving end.

4. Conclusion

The Red Team understands the importance of gathering feedback through PoCs even at an incomplete stage to accelerate the social implementation of "Loosely Coupled Trust."

In the next detailed report (v8), we expect answers to [REQ-01] through [REQ-03], including analysis of telemetry or actual attack attempts (if any) observed during PoC operations.

End of Report.